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to extract a concession from the EU. It can do so by initiating a crisis that escalates toward a mutually
disastrous gas shutoff through sequential bargaining. The risk of a gas shutoff is autonomous and contingent
upon transit uncertainty as determined by an outside actor, Ukraine. The equilibrium in the proposed
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Energy Trade Brinkmanship Between the European Union and Russia 
Alla Khalitova 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The EU–Russia energy dialogue is one of indisputable and growing 
interdependency. Russia is the EU's primary energy supplier and the EU is Russia's most 
profitable market for natural resource exports. It is curious then, that in the last two 
decades the international system has observed recurrent trade breakdowns and near–
breakdowns. A partial list of instances that threatened or disrupted oil flow to Europe 
includes the Belarus–Russia crises in 2007 and 2009, the Russia–Georgia war in 2008, an 
oil cut to Latvia in 2005 and 2006, to Estonia in 2007, and to the Czech Republic in 2008. 
In regards to natural gas, suspensions to Europe occurred in 1992, 1993, 1994, 2006, 
2008, the lengthiest and costliest shutoff to date in January 2009, and a near–cut during 
the summer of 2010. This list is expansive and the crises are not isolated. 
Literature on energy trade across the Eurasian continent has focused on 
geopolitical power and interdependency, the EU's necessity to diversify its energy 
sources, and the bilateral conflicts between Russia and the former Soviet states. There is a 
lack of a formal model to explain the dynamics of this trade and the reemergence of the 
aforementioned crises. This paper attempts to fill this void by examining primarily the 
trade of natural gas and modeling it as a game of brinkmanship between Russia and the 
EU. 
Presenting EU–Russia trade crises as games of brinkmanship is an instrumental 
contribution to the literature for several reasons. First and foremost, it is a compelling 
interpretation of the chronic gas shutoffs by Russia to the EU. Second, a formal model 
can serve in analyzing the variables that influence a state's relative bargaining power 
during a trade crisis. Third, it is a weighty example of how brinkmanship can manifest 
itself outside the scope of military security. Finally, this model can be generalized to 
understand the standoffs between Russia and the EU concerning other energy sources and 
transit routes. 
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The EU is dependent on Russian natural gas because of Russia's geographical 
proximity and market power in resource production and export. This dependency is not 
unilateral, as Russia's economy is driven by revenues from natural resource exports to the 
EU. A recent fall in the price of natural gas, when coupled with the inefficiency of 
Russia's gas industry and the drain of its heavily subsidized domestic market, has put 
pressure on Russia to exploit its Western market more aggressively. Transit states play a 
role in Russia's attempts to extract concessions from the EU. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union created bilateral monopolies on exporting energy to the EU; Russia retained the 
resource reserves, while the newly independent states retained control over the transit 
networks between Russia and the EU. This hold–up problem has been solved by the 
integration of transit capacities in nearly all but one transit state, Ukraine. Coincidentally, 
Ukraine has the largest transport capacity and direct control over the volume of gas 
flowing to the EU. Introducing the transit state into a bargaining game between Russia 
and the EU therefore accounts for the existence of some autonomous risk of gas shutoff. 
This transit uncertainty has been used as a source of threat credibility by Russia. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. I will provide background and history 
on the trilateral energy relationship between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine to establish the 
mutual dependency between Russia and the EU, Russia's incentive in disrupting the 
status quo, and the role of transit uncertainty in threat credibility. I will then propose an 
interpretation of this trade relationship by using nuclear deterrence theory to build the 
theoretical framework for a game of energy brinkmanship. 
 
2 Background 
 
The EU's natural gas consumption is rising, characterized by an increasing 
dependency on imports streaming from Russia. Its consumption is expected to grow at a 
rate of 1.5% for the next 25 years (Schaffer, 2008). Forecasts from Eurogas project that 
the EU will depend on imports for as much as 59% in 2010, and 87% by 2025 (Walker, 
2007). Russia's gas exports to Western Europe have risen from 63 billion cubic meters in 
1990 to 107 bcm in 2004 (Stern, 2005), and Gazprom, which currently controls 25–30% 
of European gas supply, is expected to become the main supplier to 28 European 
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countries (Schaffer, 2008). The EU's dependency on Russia relative to its outside options 
is a function of two factors: reserves and geography. Russia's 2009 level of proven 
natural gas reserves was estimated at about 27% of world reserves. This portion is 
sizeable when compared to European reserves, estimated at just 3% of world reserves 
(Energy Information Administration, 2009). Russia’s control of reserves is further 
magnified when taking into account its standing as the single biggest buyer of gas from 
the next major producer – Central Asia (Pirani, 2009). Reserves aside, Russia's proximity 
to the EU and difficulties associated with transporting natural gas severely circumvent 
supply competition. Natural gas is not only costly to transport in absolute terms, but its 
cost of transportation rises more rapidly than it does for oil and other resources (Russel, 
1983), implying that alternative suppliers are limited by distance. Baran (2007) makes a 
similar conclusion about the role of geography. Since pipelines are the most cost effective 
transport mechanism, but have high capital costs, then even if a supplier is geographically 
close, but holds marginal reserves, it will not enter the market.1 
Natural gas is Russia's second highest revenue generating export after oil. Even 
though the EU accounts for a third of Russia's total gas sales, these sales represented two 
thirds of gas revenues in 2006 (Heinrich, 2008). The revenue differential between EU and 
non–EU exports is sizeable; in 2008, Western Europe generated $73 billion, while all 
other exports generated $14 billion (Pugliaresi, 2009). One factor contributing to the 
profitability of the European market is the EU's lack of a unified energy policy. Russia 
maintains bilateral contracts with separate countries, and benefits from what Walker 
(2007) calls “the classic case of divide and rule”. States act tangentially to each other in 
their efforts to ensure individual energy security, giving Russia the ability to play 
countries against each other when securing energy deals (Parthasarathy, 2008, Baran, 
2007). Consequently, Russia's energy policy is centered around maintaining its trade with 
the EU and preserving a system of bilateral contracts. Repeated gas crises weaken 
Russia's ability to sustain these separate deals because it loses reputation as a reliable 
supplier. A crisis that results in a full gas shutoff is costly because Russia loses 
                                                 
1
 Stulberg (2007) calls this the “tyranny of distance of gas pipelines”; the high capital 
costs of building new pipelines and the expenses of alternative modes for transporting gas 
give Russia an advantage. 
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significant revenue. A crisis that does not end in disaster is nonetheless costly, because 
Russia incurs a threat cost in the form of policy unification and source diversification by 
the EU.2 
Gazprom is a state–regulated monopoly in control of the extraction, production, 
and export of natural gas. Several factors have caused its profits to sink. First, the 
European price of gas is correlated with the price of oil, so a recent drop in energy prices 
has hurt Gazprom's net revenues. Gazprom’s 2008 export price to Europe of $409/million 
cubic meters dropped to $280/mcm in 2009, decreasing earnings by $26 billion. Indeed, 
Gazprom reported a 52% decline in net profits between 2007 and 2008, and expected a 
further decline in 2009. The second factor is Russia's inefficient gas industry structure. 
Ahrend (2006) finds that Russia’s transition from a centrally planned economy resulted in 
productivity increases across every sector except for those that remained under state 
control. Statistics for the percent annual change in labor productivity between 1997–2004 
for Russia’s top thirty largest industries show a decrease in only three industries, the most 
drastic of which was a 5% drop in the natural gas industry. During this period, the gas 
industry also had the largest negative change in revealed comparative advantage in the 
international market (Ahrend, 2006). A further implication of government control is that 
resources are not fully capitalized upon. Gazprom owns the majority of resources with 
commercial value, so all gas sector investment decisions are driven by politics. Current 
production relies on three major fields, all of which were developed before 1991 and 
have reached productive capacity.3 Heinrich (2008) proposes that the lack of strategic 
investment and declines at current fields may lead to a production shortfall by as early as 
2010.4 The third factor is the price–controlled domestic market, full deregulation of 
                                                 
2
 After the January 2009 gas shutoff, the EU drafted a common response policy in the 
event of future cuts (“The Commission adopts new rules,” 2009, Hall, 2009, July 17), and 
formally signed plans to begin constructing Nabucco, a supply pipeline that will 
circumvent Russia (“Energy in Europe: he who pays for pipelines calls the tune,” 2009). 
3
 Production at the Urengoy, Yamburg, and Medvezhe fields peaked between 1980–1990 
at 305, 179, 75 bcm/ year respectively; since 2003, reserves have been depleted by 48%, 
39%, 75% respectively. The other major field, Zapolyarnoe, peaked at an estimated 100 
bcm in 2005, and has also begun declining (Stern, 2005). 
4
 See Nichol (2007) and Stern (2005) for a further expansion on the effect of depleting 
fields, a monopolistic industry structure, and inadequate investment on Russia's natural 
gas industry. 
4
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which is constrained by political considerations and a lack of cost transparency. Russia's 
domestic consumption increased 11% between 1999–2004, but was delivered at a 
significant $25 billion loss to Gazprom (Stern, 2005). A domestic pricing policy set by 
the government keeps prices at a level that just narrowly covers the cost of delivery.5 
These subsidies, along with a persistent nonpayment problem, have made gas cheaper 
relative to other fuels, resulting in severe overconsumption by consumers, and a lack of 
incentive for industrial efficiency and capital replacement (Stern, 2005). Gazprom's 
revenues directly affect the economic position of the state, so its current financial 
standing has put pressure on Russia to exploit its export market more aggressively and 
seek supplementary revenues.  
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and the newly independent states 
inherited a bilateral monopoly on exporting natural gas to the EU. Gazprom has sought 
aggressive regional integration with the former Soviet states and has been largely 
successful in vertically integrating export capacity. The Ukrainian government, however, 
has been averse to Gazprom acquiring equity shares in its infrastructure on political 
grounds (Stern 2005, Woehrel, 2009), and staunchly rejected Putin's 2002 proposition of 
a “joint consortium of Russian–Ukrainian pipelines” (Winrow, 2007). Ukraine has the 
largest networks in international gas trade and controls roughly 80% of the gas flowing to 
the EU (Stern, 2009). Repeated disputes between Russia and Ukraine over splitting rents– 
specifically over gas prices, transit tariffs, transport volumes, debts, and loans have 
resulted in gas crises since 1991. These are generally characterized as Ukraine's 
unwillingness to pay higher prices and Russia's subsequent gas shutoffs to coerce 
payment; or as Russia's unwillingness to pay higher transit tariffs and Ukraine's 
subsequent suspensions of gas transit. Since gas sold to Ukraine and gas sold to the EU 
flows through the same pipelines, Ukraine is able to divert European gas in order to make 
up for any reduction in its own supply or shut down transit entirely as retaliation against 
                                                 
5
 Heinrich (2008) also points to the sizeable subsidies for domestic and industrial 
consumption. 
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Russia. Ukraine has shown that it can do this in 2006 and 2009, and threatened to do so in 
2008 (Pirani, 2009).6  
Ukraine's decision to intervene in EU–Russia gas trade is determined by 
counteracting economics and politics. The 2007 economic crisis struck Ukraine's 
economy harder than any other Eastern European country; Ukraine's currency lost over 
40% of its value, and its banking sector descended into severe crisis (Woehrel, 2009). An 
attempt by Russia to increase gas prices is therefore not only politically futile, given 
Ukraine's ability to retaliate, but also ineffective because of Ukraine’s financial inability 
to respond. At the same time, Ukraine is a net energy importer, and estimates reveal that 
roughly 80% of its oil and natural gas comes from Russia (Woehrel, 2009). Ukraine's 
dependency on Russia is largely attributed to its industry structure; Nichol (2007) points 
out that Ukraine's inefficient industries are energy–intensive, and therefore heavily 
dependent on cheap Russian gas. This implies that Ukraine cannot quickly substitute into 
other forms of energy and may need to supplement its gas supply in the event of a 
reduction. Note however, that an automatic diversion of European gas is not a dominant 
strategy because it damages Ukraine's reputation as a reliable transit state. Ukraine joined 
the WTO in 2008, and is looking at potential EU and NATO membership. Consequently, 
Ukraine suffers a political cost by siphoning gas or prolonging a dispute (Woehrel, 2009, 
Pirani, 2009). The proposition then, is that a diversion of European gas is a function of 
Ukraine's internal factors that are beyond the direct control of Russia and the EU.7 
 
3 Theoretical Framework 
                                                 
6
 Multiple sources have called the gas crises a proxy for a political battle between Kiev 
and Moscow, pointing to Moscow's geopolitical aspirations in regaining control of the 
former Soviet states. Ukraine’s gradual orientation toward Western Europe and its 
Orange Revolution of 2004 is seen by Moscow as a direct attack on Kremlin. See Pirani 
(2009), Schaffer (2008), Pifer (2009), Woehrel (2009), et al. These political 
considerations are noted, but will be assumed out of model. 
7
 For example, the January 2009 crisis was characterized by indiscernible allegations: 
Ukrainian politicians, gas industry leaders, and stake holding oligarchs accused each 
other of aggravating the crisis with Russia (Pirani 2009), implying once again that the 
cross of economic and political, as well as private and government interests, make the 
escalation of a gas crisis toward a full shutoff relatively outside of the EU–Russia 
relationship. 
6
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The theory of states' physical security can be applied to model states' energy 
security. Nuclear deterrence and crisis bargaining theory model strategic interactions 
between superpowers who are mutually dependent upon preventing nuclear disaster. The 
predictions these theories make can serve as a framework for analyzing the 
interdependency between states mutually bound by an energy trade relationship. 
A game of chicken serves as a basic model for classical deterrence because it 
models two elements of deterrence theory.8 It captures the mutual cost of disaster in the 
event that both players fail to cooperate; it also illustrates that even though both players 
would prefer cooperation to mutual defection, there is conflict over splitting the 
distribution of rents because each would prefer to maintain nuclear superiority. The 
development of nuclear power gave states an instantaneous second–strike capability that 
rendered defense impossible. Classical nuclear deterrence theory is the product of an 
attempt to explain the stability of deterrence by assuming the threat of an instant and 
certain counterattack to be credible. Indeed, Zagare (2000), and Powell (1985, 1990) 
indicate that classical deterrence theory assumes that players are bound to deterministic 
threats of full–scale retaliation to punish any attempt to disrupt the status quo. What 
follows is a stable deterrence equilibrium such that no player would ever rationally 
launch an attack in anticipation of a nuclear exchange. When applied to nuclear conflicts, 
the non–cooperative outcome in a game of chicken represents an onset of a nuclear war; 
within the context of EU–Russia trade it implies a trade breakdown. A game of chicken 
therefore captures a shared incentive to sustain trade, but a simultaneous conflict over 
splitting the gains from trade given Russia's interest in extracting a concession from the 
EU. 
Under an assumption of complete information, a game of chicken always ends in 
a sub–game equilibrium; players anticipate an opponent's response and use backward 
induction to optimize their strategy. Relaxing this assumption, Zagare (1993, 2000), 
Powell (1987), Snyder (1971), et al. emphasize the significance of asymmetrical 
                                                 
8
 Brams (1968), Dixit & Skeath (2004), Ellsberg (1968), Powell (1985, 1987, 1988, 
1990), Schelling (1966), Snyder (1971), Snyder & Diesing (1977), et al. build models of 
crisis bargaining and deterrence from a game of chicken. 
7
Khalitova: Energy Trade Brinkmanship Between the European Union and Russia
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
  
information as a factor in crises, without which there is never a risk of escalation and 
disaster. Under perfect information, any potential crisis ends before it begins, with either 
successful deterrence or a successful threat. A challenger knows the defender's payoffs, 
and therefore knows whether or not a threat will be defied. Using this logic, in a pure–
threat game between Russia and the EU, if Russia anticipates compliance from the EU, it 
will threaten; but if Russia anticipates defiance, it will never rationally initiate a crisis. 
Introducing asymmetrical information into the game implies that decisions now become 
functions of a player’s own payoffs and estimates of the opponent’s payoffs, thus 
allowing for bargaining and risk escalation to enter strategic interactions. Now, at its 
initial decision node, Russia is uncertain about the likelihood that its threat will defied; 
there is some probability that the EU places a low value of the inside option and would 
rather suffer a gas shutoff than incur the cost of conceding. There is also, however, some 
probability that the EU values its trade with Russia enough to concede under certain 
conditions. Asymmetrical information is modeled by assuming that one or both players 
are uncertain about an opponent’s payoffs; a player interacts with an opponent who is one 
of two types, one that will always defy and one that will comply under given conditions.9  
The stability of deterrence predicted by classical nuclear deterrence theory rests 
on the assumption of threat credibility. This is an outstanding assumption, given that for a 
threat to be of any value it must first be believed by an opponent. Once this assumption is 
removed, classical deterrence theory unravels. Unless both players are credibly 
committed to full and automatic retaliation, a cooperative outcome is not sub–game 
perfect because each player has an incentive to secure an advantageous payoff by 
defecting. Consequently, the effectiveness of Russia's threat to instigate a gas shutoff in 
the event that the EU does not concede is contingent upon an unfailing credibility of 
threatening a costly gas shutoff. Relaxing this assumption means that if the EU does not 
concede, disaster does not happen automatically. Rather, Russia decides whether or not to 
instigate the shutoff. By cutting exports it incurs a threat cost and loses revenue; by not 
                                                 
9
 Powell, Zagare, Dixit & Skeath, et al. model uncertainty by having the challenger play 
against an opponent who is one of two types, and whose strategy depends on its type: a 
“hard” player who always defies, and a “soft” player who cooperates under given 
conditions. An outside player “Nature” chooses the probability of playing against each 
type of player. 
8
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cutting exports, it still incurs a threat cost, but continues to receive revenue. Knowing 
these payoffs, the EU is able to anticipate that as long as Russia is in full control of gas 
flow, a gas shutoff is never its dominant strategy. Consequently, Russia's pure threat is 
not credible and will never be issued. 
Strategic nuclear deterrence theory builds on classical deterrence theory because it 
recognizes the transparent incredibility of threatening “mutual suicide” and attempts to 
explain this theoretical paradox.10 Schelling (1960, 1966) and Powell (1990) argue that 
deterrence stability can rest simply on the fear of nuclear war, and therefore only requires 
moves that increase the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. This argument renders a pure–
threat of an instant full–scale retaliation not only incredible but also unnecessary. 
Schelling (1960, 1966) pinpoints the role of risk in his widely cited theory of the “threat 
that leaves something to chance”, or brinkmanship.11 The strategy of brinkmanship as a 
source of credibility rests on the assumption that defiance by an opponent results in the 
mutually costly threatened action executed without the threatener’s control. If the 
occurrence of disaster is strictly autonomous, then players are no longer bound to an 
incredible promise of a rational and deliberate decision to launch a mutual catastrophe.12 
Powell models threat credibility allowing an external player, “Nature”, to execute the 
disaster. In the case of Russia and the EU, the role of Nature is played by Ukraine. The 
probability of a gas shutoff is dictated by transit uncertainty, and specifically by 
Ukraine's internal incentives and disincentives to siphon gas sold to Europe. 
Crisis bargaining as “a competition of taking risks” that increases the exogenous 
probability of disaster over time implies the existence of some limit to escalation. This 
threshold manifests in one of two ways: either the occurrence of the mutually disastrous 
outcome, or surrender by one player. Ellsberg (1968) develops the widely cited notion of 
                                                 
10
 Powell (1985, 1987, 1990) analyzes the assumption of perfect credibility in MAD and 
concludes that a pure threat of full–scale nuclear war is never credible; a state will never 
make the threat to rationally launch nuclear war knowing that other state will retaliate. 
11
 Schelling (1960, 1966), Snyder(1971), Ellsberg (1968) et al. note other mechanisms of 
making threats credible, including changing own payoffs, removing options, public 
political involvement, building reputation, the interdependency of other commitments, 
etc.; this paper focuses on brinkmanship. 
12
 For more on brinkmanship, see Schelling (1960, 1966), Powell (1985, 1990), Snyder 
(1971), Snyder & Diesing (1977), Zagare (2000) et al. 
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“critical risk” using an example of a blackmailer and a victim. In the three–step game, the 
blackmailer issues a threat, the victim decides whether to comply or defy, and the 
blackmailer decides whether or not to punish if the threat was defied. Ellsberg proposes 
that the victim's expectation of the probability of punishment determines the willingness 
to comply. He thus formulates the conclusion that the execution of punishment only 
needs to be sufficiently likely, rather than certain. Dixit and Skeath (2004) express the 
idea of risk tolerance by defining an “acceptability” and “effectiveness” condition for the 
equilibrium in their model of nuclear deterrence. Acceptability determines the maximum 
risk that the challenger tolerates before conceding, while effectiveness determines the 
maximum risk that the opponent tolerates before conceding. Powell (1987, 1988, 1990) 
defines risk tolerance as “resolve”, which is the risk threshold at which a player is 
indifferent between escalating and submitting.13 He models a brinkmanship crisis to show 
the role of resolve in determining the game equilibrium using what he argues as the three 
essential elements of brinkmanship: asymmetrical information, a gradual escalation of 
risk, and a series of decisions.14 It begins with the challenger's decision to disrupt the 
status quo by issuing a threat. If a threat is issued, the decision moves to the opponent, 
who then decides whether to comply or defy. Defiance escalates the crisis such that 
disaster happens with some autonomous probability. If disaster does not occur, the 
decision returns to the challenger who now decides whether to back down or escalate the 
game further, and therefore create an even greater probability of disaster. The game thus 
continues until one player reaches its threshold tolerable risk. The relative values of each 
player's risk tolerance will determine who concedes first.15  
 
                                                 
13
 Also see Schelling, Snyder & Jervis, et al. for citations on resolve. 
14
 Snyder (1971), Snyder and Diesing (1977) define a crisis as a case in which “a threat is 
issued and is initially resisted”, thus paralleling Powell's assertion about the role of 
sequential decisions. 
15
 Note that Powell acknowledges the role of resolve in determining the sequential 
equilibria in bargaining games, but challenges the predominant proposition that the player 
with greatest resolve will unconditionally prevail in a crisis. He argues that beliefs about 
an opponent's resolve are just as important as actual resolve. Asymmetrical information 
allows for bluffing and misperceptions such that the longer a game continues, the more 
certain a player may become that an opponent is “resolute”, and therefore may chose to 
yield before reaching its own resolve. 
10
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4 Brinkmanship Model 
  
I now develop a brinkmanship model of unilateral deterrence under asymmetrical 
information to model sequential interactions between two agents in a single game in 
which one player attempts to preserve the status quo, and the other to disrupt it by means 
of a successful threat. Russia’s objective is to extort a concession from the EU; the EU's 
objective is to maintain uninterrupted gas flow without transferring a concession to 
Russia. This game is modeled in Figure 1.16 
The game begins with a neutral player, Nature, choosing a probability p that the 
EU places a low value on the inside option, such that the value of concession, denoted c, 
is larger than the value of uninterrupted gas trade, denoted v. This type of EU player is 
denoted EULow. Implied is that there is a probability 1 – p that the EU places a high value 
on its inside option, such that the value of continued trade is greater than the cost of 
conceding. This player is denoted EUHigh. Consequently, EULow will never concede, and 
EUHigh will concede under some conditions. Russia is aware that for EULow, c > v, and for 
EUHigh, c < v, but is uncertain about the probability of playing against each type of player, 
or the relative values of each player's variables. This means that at its initial decision 
node, Russia's decision to initiate a crisis is determined by the expected value of its status 
quo payoff and the expected value of initiating a crisis given its beliefs about the EU's 
payoffs and the probability of playing against an opponent that will never concede. 
Russia's status quo payoff is the value of revenue from uninterrupted gas exports, denoted 
g. By initiating a crisis Russia incurs a threat cost, denoted t, which is assumed to be sunk 
and constant. Threat cost is smaller than the value of the EU's potential concession, 
otherwise the decision to issue a threat would not be rational. The value of the concession 
is smaller than the value of continued trade to model Russia's dependency on gas exports, 
but a potential to gain extra rents. To summarize, assume that t < c < g. 
If Russia makes an initial threat, it creates a small risk of gas shutoff, denoted q. 
Nature moves next by executing disaster with this probability q; the game progresses to 
the EU with a probability 1 – q. If Russia is playing against EULow, the EU will escalate 
until disaster occurs with certainty. If Russia is playing against EUHigh, the EU will 
                                                 
16
 Payoffs are listed in the order “Russia, EU” 
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escalate until it reaches its critical risk tolerance. Russia’s decision to escalate is 
determined by its expected value of capitulating given the incurred threat cost and the 
expected value of persisting. Each time that a player escalates, the probability q that 
Nature will instigate a trade breakdown slightly increases. In other words, Russia and the 
EU will gradually heighten q, such that qi < qj for i < j, where q ∈ [0,1]. If a breakdown 
does occur, the game ends and Russia receives a payoff of – t, while the EU receives a 
payoff of zero. If disaster does not occur, the game ends at q*, which represents threshold 
risk of gas shutoff at which the player with the lower risk tolerance will stop escalation. 
At this juncture either Russia will cease threatening, or the EU will transfer a concession.  
The difference between Russia's status quo payoff and its payoff for surrendering 
once it has unilaterally disrupted the status quo models a difference in the expected value 
of initiating a crisis and escalating a crisis. Russia's resolve is lower at its initial decision 
node, and increases for escalation decision nodes once it incurs a threat cost. Here 
emerges the value of the assumption of Russia's imperfect information. Given full 
knowledge of the EU's payoffs and the probability of playing against a player that will 
never concede, Russia will never rationally initiate a crisis if it anticipates its resolve 
being lower. If however, it misjudges and unknowingly initiates a crisis, its resolve may 
now increase enough to surpass the EU's resolve. Uncertainty may result in the initiation 
of a crisis that would not have happened under perfect information, and subsequently 
allow a player with lower initial resolve to prevail. 
 
Figure 1 
12
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Brinkmanship Model Equilibrium 
 
The following three equilibrium conditions determine the players’ resolve 
functions. These resolve functions will determine the game equilibrium and are modeled 
in Figure 2. 
1. The Initiation Condition: determines when it's in Russia’s interest to 
initiate a crisis. This decision is determined by the expected value of 
initiating a crisis and the expected value of the status quo payoff. Russia 
13
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issues a brinkmanship threat if EVThreat > EVNoThreat, or 
p(g− t − qg) + (1− p)(g− t + c) > g . Implied is that if the risk of disaster 
renders EVThreat < EVNoThreat, status quo stands. This means that Russia will 
initiate a crisis as long as the risk of disaster is q < c(1− p) − t
pg
. 
2. The Escalation Condition: determines how long Russia will continue to 
escalate a crisis. Russia's decisions to escalate will now weigh the 
expected value of the status quo payoff minus the threat cost against the 
expected value of continuing coercion. If an initial threat has been issued, 
Russia will escalate a crisis as long as EVEscalateThreat > EVStopThreat, or 
p(g− t − qg) + (1− p)(g− t + c) > g− t . Implied is that once escalation 
reaches a risk of disaster at which EVEscalateThreat < EVStopThreat Russia will 
stop escalation. This means that Russia will escalate a crisis as long as 
q* < c(1− p)
pg
.Where c(1− p) − t
pg
<
c(1− p)
pg
, demonstrates that a 
challenger's risk tolerance rises once a crisis has been initiated. 
3. The Defiance Condition: determines how long the EU will continue to 
defy Russia's threats. The length of EU’s resistance is determined by the 
expected value of conceding and the expected value of escalating. EUHigh 
will escalate a crisis by defying Russia's threat as long as EVConcede < 
EVNotConcede, or vh − c < vh −qvh. Implied is that once escalation reaches a 
risk of gas shutoff at which EVConcede > EVNotConcede, the EU will make a 
concession. This means that the EU will escalate as long as the probability 
of disaster is q* < c
vh
.  
Figure 2 illustrates the three equilibrium conditions. Russia's initial resolve 
function is denoted Ri* and shifts to Re* for decisions at escalation nodes. EUHigh's resolve 
is denoted EUHigh*. Assuming that each player escalates q precisely until it reaches its 
own critical risk, and a gas shutoff does not occur before one player reaches this 
threshold, then for a given p the player with the higher resolve will prevail. The 
maximum risk threshold is represented by the bolded line. For p < p*, Russia will be 
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successful at extracting a concession from the EU; for p > p*, the EU will win the 
bargaining game by resisting until Russia yields. 
Figure 2 
 
 
Given the presence of asymmetrical information, Russia's optimizing strategy 
depends on the probability of playing against a player that will never relent. Russia's 
resolve function intersects EUhigh's resolve function at  
c(1− p) − t
pg
=
c
vh
. For values p below p = vhc − vht
gc + vhc
, the likelihood of playing against an 
EULow that will always defy a threat is sufficiently low that Russia's optimal strategy is to 
initiate a crisis. For values p above the specified function, the likelihood of playing 
against an EULow renders the risk of being defied too dangerous, so Russia's strategy is to 
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maintain the status quo. As derived in the Escalation Condition, Russia's risk tolerance 
increases for decisions at escalation nodes relative to its initial decision node; its new 
resolve function intersects EUHigh's resolve function at 
c(1− p)
pg
=
c
vh
. Russia is now 
willing to continue escalation against a higher probability of facing EULow, or for values p 
below p = vhc
gc + vhc
. As before, for values p above the specified function, the EU’s 
resolve will surpass Russia’s. In summary, vhc − vht
gc + vhc
<
vhc
gc + vhc
. 
 Russia's initial resolve function intersects a certainty of gas shutoff q =1 at 
p = c − t
g+ c
. For values p below than the specified function, Russia is willing to issue pure 
deterministic threat because the probability of playing against EUlow is markedly low. 
Russia's willingness to issue a pure threat increases further once the crisis has been 
initiated, making it willing to issue a deterministic threat for values p below p = c
g+ c
. 
Regardless, brinkmanship is the preferred strategy once credibility is taken into account. 
 
Comparative Statics 
 
A shift in a player’s resolve function represents a change in its risk tolerance; a 
shift up implies that a player is willing to bargain longer and tolerates a higher risk of 
disaster, and vice versa. A decrease in Russia's valuation of gas exports increases its risk 
tolerance because it suffers a lower loss in the event of a crisis. All else equal, for lower 
revenue levels, Russia is willing to escalate to a higher probability of disaster. 
Consequently, Russia's dependency on continued revenues from its trade with the EU is a 
determinant of its relative bargaining power. A change in the threat cost only affects 
Russia’s decision to initiate a crisis; an increase in the threat cost shifts Russia's initial 
resolve down because a higher potential sunk cost makes Russia less likely to initiate a 
crisis. A change in the probability of playing against an EU that will never comply 
represents a shift along Russia's resolve function. A higher probability of facing an EU 
that places a low valuation on the inside option constitutes a higher probability of 
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unsuccessful threat, so Russia tolerates a lower risk of disaster. For the EU, a decrease in 
the value of Russian gas imports shifts its resolve up. A lower value means that the EU is 
less dependent on Russia as a trade partner, so its risk tolerance of a trade breakdown is 
higher. On the other hand, an increase in its valuation of the inside option decreases its 
resolve, showing that the EU's dependency on continued trade with Russia is a 
determinant of its relative bargaining power. The value of the potential concession 
represents the rents bargained over; subsequently, a change in the magnitude of this 
variable affects both players' resolves in the same direction. A larger concession is 
costlier for the EU and increases its tolerance of disaster; a larger concession represents 
more potential gains for Russia, and also increases its tolerance of disaster. 
 
5 Application 
 
During the summer of 2009, a standoff between Russia and the EU escalated 
toward a trade breakdown when Russia issued a threat of another gas shutoff unless the 
EU assisted Ukraine in paying its gas bills and debts. Beginning in May 2009, Russia 
voiced concerns about Ukraine's ability to make its gas payments and suggested that it 
may need financial assistance from the EU (Shiryaevskaya, 2009). The EU resisted on 
the basis of budget concerns, declaring that financial aid to Ukraine would be “difficult, if 
not impossible” (Hall, 2009, June 1). By June, Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
issued a formal warning of Ukraine's approaching deadlines, and of a gas suspension to 
Ukraine if it failed to meet them (Kanter, 2009). An adamant resistance by the EU 
manifested an internal discussion document calling to stand firm on Russia’s demands 
(“Energetic blackmail,” 2009). Tensions increased as each side tested its opponent's 
willingness to escalate, knowing that a gas shutoff was largely dependent upon Ukraine. 
On July 17, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso informed Putin that 
financial aid may be possible, but not until late autumn, citing the extensive time needed 
to put together an international loan (Iago, 2009). Just 12 days later, the IMF released a 
loan of $3.3 billion17 to Ukraine, specifying that these funds be used for gas reforms 
(“Premier says new IMF tranche to help Ukraine,” 2009). On July 31, The European 
                                                 
17
 The loan was part of a $16.4 billion general economic aid package. 
17
Khalitova: Energy Trade Brinkmanship Between the European Union and Russia
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
  
Commission approved another loan package of $1.7 billion to assist Ukraine with its 
payments and industrial restructuring (Hall, 2009, August 4). This sequence of events 
demonstrates the significance in modeling this bargaining crisis as brinkmanship. A 
direct threat of a gas shutoff was never declared; rather, each side escalated the risk of 
disaster by prolonging negotiations that may have eventually resulted in the mutually 
costly shutoff being triggered by Ukraine. By helping Ukraine pay its debts and higher 
gas prices to Russia, the EU eliminated the exogenous risk and ended escalation.  
Returning to the crises listed at the beginning of this paper, a trend similar to the 
one just described emerges. Russia has consistently used transit states as a way of 
relinquishing control of escalation during trade crises. This was the case in a four–day 
gas dispute with Belarus in June 2010 when Russia insisted that any reductions in gas 
flow to the EU were caused by Belarus’ failure to make its payments (Schwirtz, 2010). 
Another instance, the most prominent and severe gas crisis to date, occurred in January 
2009 after a price dispute between Ukraine and Russia caused a suspension of gas to 
Europe for nearly three weeks. Media analyses were quick to liken the crisis to the 2006 
gas crisis, specifically because escalation was once again triggered by transit 
uncertainty.18 A notable bargaining sequence occurred also during the Russia–Georgia 
conflict in 2008. After the EU accused Russia of breaking international law (Waterfield, 
2009), Russia threatened the EU’s energy supply by bombing around, but never directly 
at, the oil transit networks to Europe (McElroy, 2008). 
Brinkmanship captures an element that is nearly universal to these crises. A threat 
of trade breakdown is never directly issued. Nor does it need to be, because probabilistic 
threats hinged upon autonomous risk are often effective at fulfilling motives. Applying 
nuclear deterrence theory to model EU–Russia energy trade as brinkmanship, such that 
the risk of disaster is driven by transit uncertainty, therefore provides an interesting 
explanation for the persistence of trade breakdowns that would not otherwise seem 
logical. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 See Stern (2006), Pirani (2009), and Pirani, Stern, Yafimava, & Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies (2009) for more on the details of the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes. 
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